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1 Introduction
This study is an attempt to contribute to the wide and vibrant discussions on foreign aid e¤ectiveness
and the impacts of debt relief. Because these strands of literature have had, and will have implications
for practical level decisions on aid allocation and debt relief, it is important to consider the issues
from various angles. Here, the focus is on a growth component that has, at least so far, gained less
attention: our interest lies in technical e¢ ciency or technological catch-up, and the possible role of aid
and debt in improving or retarding growth through this channel. As many arguments for or against
aid implicitly refer to the impact of aid on technical e¢ ciency, the aspect is noteworthy. Moreover,
aid-growth discussion has, until now, largely neglected to control for external debt, or debt service,
even if the literature on debt and growth implies that the level of debt does play a role in economic
growth.
We follow Haaparanta and Virta (2007), who calculate scores of technical e¢ ciency for a sample of
countries by using data envelopment analysis as in Kumar and Russell (2002). These scores measure
the distance of a country to the world technology frontier at a certain time, as illustrated in Figure
1, where point 0 presents the initial input-output combination and point 1 the combination in period
1. The solid line gives the technology frontier at date 0, and the dash line in period 1. In the case
depicted in the gure, initial production lies below the output that could have been obtained by using
existing technology as e¢ ciently as possible. The distance to the frontier is denoted by the vertical
arrow between the observed input-output combination and the frontier, and measures e¢ ciency: the
e¢ ciency score equals the ratio of actual output to the potential output at the frontier. The change
in output between the two periods can be decomposed into changes in (1) inputs, depicted by the
movement along the initial technology frontier, (2) technology, depicted by the shift of the technology
frontier, and (3) e¢ ciency, measured by the change in the e¢ ciency score.
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Figure 1. E¢ ciency scores
Haaparanta and Virta (2007) follow this approach and decompose changes in international labour
productivity distribution (distribution of GDP/labour) between 1980 and 2000 into changes in e¢ -
ciency and technology, as well as physical and human capital accumulation. According to the results,
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the labour productivity distribution of low-income countries did not change statistically signicantly
between the two years. The decomposition of the change implies, however, that while capital decu-
lumated between 1980 and 2000, technical e¢ ciency improved. The contrast was especially strong
in Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), for which Figure 2 gives the decomposition of labour
productivity change.
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Figure 2. Labour productivity changes in HIPCs between 1980 and 2000
The rst diagram of Figure 2 shows the kernel estimates of the labour productivity distributions
in 1980 and in 2000 (the latter is depicted by the dash line). Also, b = 1980 and c = 2000. The
second diagram depicts labour productivity distribution in 2000 together with the 1980 distribution
augmented by physical capital accumulation. The third diagram adds the impact of e¢ ciency change,
and the fourth technological change. Finally, the last diagram shows the combined impact of all the
underlying changes, including human capital accumulation. As expected, the distributions match in
the last diagram.
To summarise the implications of Figure 2, the aggregate changes in labour productivity distribu-
tion between 1980 and 2000 were minor in HIPCs. Actually, statistical tests in Haaparanta and Virta
(2007) conrm that the distribution did not change statistically signicantly between the two years.
Changes in technical e¢ ciency had, however, a large, positive, and statistically signicant impact on
the distribution of labour productivity: they reduced the proportion of countries at low productivity
levels and increased the proportion of countries at relatively high output per worker levels, moving
therefore the distribution to the right. Although HIPCs thus beneted from improved e¢ ciency, tech-
nological change and contraction in capital accumulation nullied the consequences of this positive
development. The signicantly improved e¢ ciency raises the question of the causes behind the im-
provement, especially whether foreign aid and debt played any roles. Another question of particular
interest is whether, as conjectured by Haaparanta and Virta, poor countries tried to use the existing
capital stock as e¢ ciently as possible but, due to lack of funds, were unable even to replace the capital
that depreciated.
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We begin by reviewing the research on aid-growth and debt-growth nexuses. We then proceed to
the theoretical literature on the factors that determine technological catch-up, or distance to frontier,
and develop two small models to incorporate some aspects not touched elsewhere. Finally, we present
empirical evidence on the impacts of aid and debt on e¢ ciency change. Section 5 concludes.
2 Aid, Debt, and Growth in Literature
This section provides a short literature review on the impacts of foreign aid and external debt on
growth. Later, focus will shift to an important, but less studied, component of growth, namely technical
e¢ ciency of production.
2.1 The Role of Aid: Conicting and Not That Robust Results
Literature on aid e¤ectiveness has used various methods from detailed case studies to empirical cross-
country analyses, producing at the same time conicting and not that robust results. The literature
can be divided into three generations (Hansen and Tarp 2000). The rst two of these were interested
in the link between aid and savings, and the relationship of aid, investment and growth, respectively.
Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) argue that the general conclusion from the cross-country regressions of
the rst two generations is that aid increases investment and, therefore, growth. According to Hansen
and Tarp (2000), some of the more pessimistic results of these generations gained disproportionate
attention just because they were contrarian.
As Roodman (2004) lists, the current generation of aid studies has introduced several innovations.
The availability of data has improved, which is reected in the number of countries and years included
in the studies. Regressors comprise now economic and institutional variables. The methods have also
improved: current research applies two-stage least squares and di¤erence or system GMM (Arellano
and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998) to account for the endogeneity of aid and policy. After an
inuential study of Burnside and Dollar (2000), discussion has in addition focused on the interaction
of aid with other factors. Despite the improvements, poor quality of data means that all the results
have to be taken with a grain of salt.
The prominent claim of Burnside and Dollar (2000) is that aid has a positive impact on growth in a
good policy environment (including scal, monetary, and trade policy), but with diminishing returns.
Burnside and Dollar two-stage least squares regressions have, however, been criticised on econometric
basis (Hansen and Tarp 2001). Moreover, the results do not seem to be robust to the inclusion of other
interaction terms or to expanding the data set (Dalgaard and Hansen 2001; Guillamont and Chauvet
2001; Hansen and Tarp 2001; Roodman 2004). Nevertheless, Burnside and Dollar (2004) support
their earlier results with a new data set focusing on the 1990s and an overall measure of institutional
quality. They also claim that other methods of aid e¤ectiveness research, such as case studies, data on
individual projects nanced by aid, and opinion polls, support the view that weak policies limit the
e¤ectiveness of aid.
Hansen and Tarp (2001) use di¤erence GMM to overcome the endogeneity problems of Burnside
and Dollar regressions. They conclude that aid probably increases growth with decreasing returns1 ,
but that the joint impact of aid and policy is insignicant, thus undermining the results of Burnside
and Dollar. After including investment and human capital in growth regression with the result that
aid then does not have any e¤ect on growth, Hansen and Tarp deduce also that aid a¤ects GDP growth
through investment. Also Collier and Dollar (2004) nd that aid increases investment.2
Even if the original results of Burnside and Dollar are not robust, various other studies have o¤ered
evidence of a nonlinear relationship between aid and growth. Some of these vouch for the importance
1Roodman (2004) conducts several robustness tests for aid-growth regressions. His main nding is that a positive
but diminishing return to aid is the only even remotely robust relationship in the data. Collier (2006) also nds quite
strongly diminishing returns to aid and discusses various reforms to aid policies to overcome the problem.
2Aid can a¤ect technological progress as well as the investment rate: aid tends to have a positive impact on the
accumulation of technological knowledge, partly so because roughly 50 % of aid can be categorized as technical grants
(Islam 2003). It is, therefore, interesting to see whether this is reected in changes of economic e¢ ciency.
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of interaction between aid and policy, while others nd that the joint e¤ect of aid with some other
variable is more important.
Among the rst group, Collier and Dollar (2002) nd evidence of a joint impact of aid and policy
in a larger data set and with other policy variable than the one originally used by Burnside and Dollar.
Collier and Dehn (2001) incorporate export price shocks into Burnside-Dollar regressions to account
for the shock proneness of many small developing countries. Unsurprisingly, the results imply that the
shocks play a role: negative shocks reduce growth signicantly. At the same time, the addition of the
shocks seems to a¤ect the robustness of the Burnside and Dollar results positively. Collier and Hoe­ er
(2002) nd, furthermore, that the e¤ectiveness of aid is heightened in a good policy environment after
a civil war. In the same spirit, Islam (2003) concludes that aid e¤ectiveness varies between political
regimes: aid seems to have little impact on growth in tinpot countries, but its e¤ect on growth is
positive and robust in totalitarian countries.3
Among the studies not supporting Burnside and Dollar, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) show in a
theoretical model that good policies can actually reduce the e¤ectiveness of aid. According to their
empirical estimations, the conclusion of Burnside and Dollar depends heavily on the data set used.
Guillamont and Chauvet (2001) nd that the joint role played by the empirical factors contributing to
the structural economic vulnerability of a country and aid is crucial, while the interaction between aid
and policy is insignicant. The results of Dalgaard et al. (2004) imply, instead, that aid only raises
GDP growth outside tropics.
All in all, even if a majority of the recent studies nds that aid a¤ects economic growth positively,
the evidence is mixed (Easterly et al. 2004; Roodman 2004).4 The methods and regressors vary
between studies, as do also data sources and time periods. Some aspects have, in addition, been
largely neglected. An important shortcoming of aid-growth literature is that the potential role of
external debt has barely been studied. Similarly, aid-growth studies do not usually touch all the
channels through which aid could work, the only exceptions being the studies on the impact of aid
through capital accumulation. For example, there are hardly any studies on the impacts of aid on
total factor productivity or technical e¢ ciency.
Because a strict focus on aid-growth connection results often in somewhat limited contributions to
policy discussion, decomposing growth into its components could be useful. Therefore, we concentrate
on the impact of aid on technical e¢ ciency.5 In theory, aid can reduce e¢ ciency through several
channels, many of which are related to moral hazard. First, aid can be ine¢ cient because, with aid
coming, the recipients may not be motivated to initiate benecial economic and structural reforms.
This e¤ect is magnied by two-sided aid dependency: because recipient countries are poor and aid is
often a signicant proportion of their income, donors know that aid cannot be stopped rapidly. This
gives the poor countries some power in aid negotiations and strengthens their incentives not to use the
resources as e¢ ciently as possible.
Another side of aid dependency is the dependency of many donor country organizations on aid.
Because their existence is based on being a part of the chain of delivering aid, they may be more
concerned on distributing the aid promptly and satisfying all the requirements of formal accounting
than the quality of aid. For example EU aid has been criticised of this (Martens et al. 2002). Reinikka
and Svensson (2005) have shown that the channel through which the aid is distributed matters.
Also other sources of aid ine¢ ciency can be found in donor behaviour. A practice still continuing
is tying aid to purchases from donor country rms, which prevents the most e¢ cient use of the funds.
Similarly, aid given to donor country NGOs is tied aid. Furthermore, project aid is associated with
ine¢ ciency, as it wastes local resources (for example government o¢ cialswork), which would be needed
somewhere else.
However, there are also channels through which aid can improve technical e¢ ciency. For example,
with the help of increased aid, countries can a¤ord to buy latest technology. Thus, the relationship
between aid and e¢ ciency is ambiguous, a priori.
3Tinpot is a weak form of dictatorship in which the dictator aims at maximizing personal consumption and avoids
unnecessary consumption in repression or generating loyalty.
4One plausible explanation for this is that even if aid does a¤ect growth positively, the traditional focus on the e¤ect
of aid over a short period has lead to misleading results (Clemens et al. 2004).
5Kök and Deliktas¸ (2004) and Hermes et al. (2006) choose the same approach.
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2.2 What about Debt?
Also the relationship between external debt and growth has been an important topic in empirical
research over the past few years. Given the importance of debt problems in many developing countries
and the attempts made to alleviate the problem, this is natural. Empirical analysis can give an idea
of how important debt relief is. At the same time, the search for determinants of growth has been
very intensive, allowing one to see debt in the broader context of development. Finally, there are some
theories of external debt and growth on which empirics can be based.
Theory supports a non-linear relationship between a countrys growth rate and its level of external
debt relative to GDP. At low levels of debt, external borrowing boosts investment both in human
and physical capital, therefore increasing growth. If the debt burden is very heavy, other e¤ects may,
however, become stronger. The idea behind the literature on debt overhang is that at high levels of
debt, a large share of returns to investment may go to servicing the debt. If the debt is held by the
government, this leads to higher taxes. Expectations of higher and more distortionary taxes discourage
investment, which then slows down capital accumulation. Analogously, it can be argued that with a
severe debt burden, government e¤orts to enhance overall policy environment benet mostly creditors.
This can a¤ect growth through factor accumulation and total factor productivity.
As to empirical results, the concern about poor-quality data should not be forgotten. Chowdhury
(2004) argues, nevertheless, that there is a strong causal link from external debt to growth irrespective
of the denition of debt. In addition, there is some evidence of a non-linear relationship between
external indebtedness and growth, which supports the debt overhang hypothesis (Clements et al. 2003;
Pattillo et al. 2004; Cordella et al. 2005), even though also conicting views have been presented
(Presbitero 2005). At the same time, there seem to be di¤erences between Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPCs) and other developing countries: Cordella et al. (2005) and Hepp (2005) nd that
the level of debt does not seem to a¤ect growth in HIPCs. The most likely explanation is that donors
have increased aid to these countries, which has then reduced the impact of the level of debt on growth
(Cordella et al. 2005). Thus, it is important to control for aid in the analysis.
There is also evidence of a non-linear relationship between debt and some growth components, total
factor productivity growth in particular, even if the literature on the determinants of TFP growth is
scarce (Bosworth and Collins 2003; Pattillo et al. 2004). Pattillo et al. (2004) nd that TFP growth is
negatively a¤ected by lagged income per capita (indicating convergence), positively by human capital
and investment, as well as by budget balance and openness, and non-linearly by debt/income ratio. Of
these, only lagged income and budget balance are signicant in all regressions with di¤erent estimation
methods.
Interestingly, some debt-growth studies have accounted for foreign aid. In Cordella et al. (2005),
aid is included only in a linear form and does not have a statistically signicant impact on growth.
The same holds for aid interacted with a HIPC-dummy. Hepp (2005) uses both aid and aid2, and
aidpolicy and (aid  policy)2, but does not, in general, nd them to be statistically signicant, except
for aid  policy terms for HIPCs. In his estimations, various measures of debt enter only linearly.
Presbitero (2005) includes aid and debt and debt service in estimations of an investment equation and
nds them statistically signicant in many estimations. Also the research of Cohen (1993), Serven and
Solimano (1993), and Warner (1992) implies that debt has an impact on investment. Hansen (2004)
shows that aid and debt work through their impact on both investment and growth.
We continue this line of work by studying the impact of debt and aid on technical e¢ ciency. Indeed,
if aid and debt have a¤ect investment as well as an independent e¤ect on growth (controlling for in-
vestment like in Hansen 2004), it is necessary to understand how the growth e¤ect arises. The question
is then whether debt and aid have an impact on how a country utilises technological opportunities.
This ties our study to the recent discussions on the distance to world technological frontier and its
impacts on growth.
3 Aid, Debt, and E¢ ciency in Theory
Early work on technical e¢ ciency and catch-up was done by Nelson and Phelps (1966). The models
presented here are tailored to capture the role of aid and debt in a nancially constrained economy
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and with political considerations.
3.1 Financing Constraints in a Two-Period Model
The basic case with a two-period economy with a benevolent policymaker maximizing the welfare
of citizens shows how problems of e¢ ciency may arise even with well-behaved policymakers in the
presence of nancial constraints.
The utility function of a representative agent is
U = u (c0)  d (e) + u (c1) (1)
and the budget constraints the agent faces are
c0 + I = y0 +B   (1 + r0)B0 (2)
and
c1 = F (K0; I; e)  (1 + r1)B1, (3)
where u () = the ow of utility,  = time preference, ci = consumption in period i, e = e¤ort needed
to improve the e¢ ciency at which current technology is used, d () = cost of e¤ort in terms of welfare,
I = investment, y0 = initial income, B0 = initial stock of debt, B = ow of new funds in period
0 (aid, debt forgiveness, new loans), ri = rate of interest on loans in period i, B1 = external debt in
period 16 , and F (K0; I; e) = gross production in period 1, with K0 = capital stock at the beginning
of period 0. The level of external debt and ow of new funds are determined by foreign nanciers and
donors and are exogenous to the economy. The economy is thus constrained in its external nance.
E¢ ciency is modelled as the level of e¤ort put into improving productivity. The cost of e¤ort
is incurred today (period 0), but the fruits are picked tomorrow (period 1). The idea behind this
formulation is that improving e¢ ciency may require more local e¤ort (for example in reorganizing
production and training workers, or costly policy reforms) than just buying new capital goods. The
formulation is also consistent with the view that e¤ort is put into reducing the gap to best available
techniques. A consequence of the modelling is that the only possible means for the policymakers to
engage in intertemporal trade is through the choice of the level of e¤ort.
With these preliminaries, the utility function can be rewritten as
U = u [y0 +B   (1 + r0)B0   I]  d (e) + u [F (K0; I; e)  (1 + r1)B1] ; (4)
which is to be maximised with respect to current investment and e¤ort to improve e¢ ciency.
With the usual assumptions of concave utility functions, convex cost of e¤ort and positive but
declining marginal products of investment and e¤ort in period 1 production, it is easy to show that
the qualitative properties of the model depend on the sign of the cross derivative of the intertemporal
utility function
sgnUIe = sgn [u" (c1)FIFe + u0 (c1)FIe] : (5)
When the sign is positive, investments in e and in I are complements: the higher the initial debt,
the lower will both e and I be. An increase in current ow of funds to the economy increases then
both e¢ ciency and investment. In contrast, the prospect of future debt forgiveness, d (1 + r1)B1 < 0,
reduces both e and I.
If, on the other hand, UIe < 0, e and I are substitutes. In particular, a higher level of external
debt implies higher e¤ort and lower investment. Expected future forgiveness leads to a reduction in
e¤ort but increases investment. The impact of debt on growth is ambiguous. This could be called
the "Cuba phenomenon": in Cuba US cars from 1950s are still being used, most likely very e¢ ciently
compared to their use anywhere else in the world.
6Note that B1 is taken to include also the potential future (period 1) debt forgiveness. Hence, it does not have to
equal the debt left from period 0.
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The sign of the cross derivative depends on the form of the production function and the level of
debt. If the period 1 production function is F (eK0 + I), the cross derivative is negative. But even if
e¤ort and investment are complements in production, they can be substitutes in utility. To show this,
assume that the period 1 production function is A (e)F (K; I). Then
sgnUIe = sgnA0u0FI

u" (c1) [c1 + (1 + r1)B1]
u0 (c1)
+ 1

(6)
and the sign is determined by the degree of risk aversion and the expected size of the debt. Thus,
connection between debt and growth may di¤er in countries with di¤erent debt burdens, which should
be controlled for in empirical estimations. The important insight is that a heavy debt burden may
reduce aid e¤ectiveness: at high debt levels, increased aid boosts capital accumulation but restrains the
e¤ort to utilise the inputs e¢ ciently. At low levels of debt, the connection is one of complementarity:
increased aid goes both to investment and e¢ ciency improvement. From the point of view of this
model, estimating the change in e¢ ciency requires controlling for the initial debt and the net inows
of new resources, in addition to initial capital stock(s) and/or initial income. That is what is done in
the empirical part in Section 4.
Another theory of technological e¢ ciency and nancing constraints is developed by Acemoglu
et al. (2006). In their model, entrepreneurs, who are the people adopting more e¢ cient existing
technologies or innovating new technologies, lack funds and need to borrow from nanciers. With
imperfect information, there is an agency problem, which is the worse the longer the distance to the
technological frontier is. Thus, the model suggests that initial conditions (the prevailing distance to the
frontier in particular) have a strong e¤ect on how fast the economy can approach the frontier. While
the model is not directly geared to the problem studied here, we account for the potential impact of
the existing technology gap. Acemoglu et al. argue also that openness can a¤ect the speed at which
the technology gap is closed. We take this into account.
3.2 Aid, Debt, and Politics
A major part of the debate on the impacts of aid and debt concerns the relationship between aid,
debt and domestic policies. The next model incorporates some of the potential channels between these
variables.
3.2.1 The Framework
There are three types of agents. The rst type is the ruler, who makes the decisions as long as she
is in power. She can voluntarily yield up her power to citizens, who are the second type of agent. In
this case, the economy switches to democracy. The third type of agent is the external nancier/donor.
All the agents are innitely lived, and time is divided into discrete periods. The actions within each
period are as follows: rst, if the ruler is still in power at the beginning of period, she decides whether
to give power to the citizens or not. After that the ruler, assuming she remains in power, decides
how to tax the citizens and, simultaneously, citizens decide how to produce. As in Acemoglu (2003)7 ,
citizens have two alternatives: they can produce either in formal or informal economy. In the former,
income is fully taxable, while in informal economy it is not. This is where technical e¢ ciency enters
the picture: production technology is less e¢ cient in the informal sector than in formal economy. Thus
the choice of production method is the link between policies, institutions, and productive e¢ ciency.
The third type of actor, the external nancier sets debt repayment schedule and gives aid. The per
period debt repayment is Gi (j), i = dic, dem, where dic = dictatorship (if the ruler is still in the
power at the end of the period) and dem = if the political system is democracy. The donors can tie
debt payments/forgiveness and aid on policies and the state of the economy indexed by j, which is a
way to incorporate odious debt, the share of which is estimated to be between 30 and 60 per cent of
the total developing country debt (Birdsall et al. 2002). It is assumed, for simplicity, that the donor
7Our set-up is inspired by Acemoglu (2003) in many respects. There are two main di¤erences to Acemoglus work.
First, we assume that the ruler and the citizens act simultaneously in the second stage and we include the external actor.
Second, we assume that there are tax collection costs.
7
is passive in the sense that the debt repayment schedule is xed, and that the donor does not make
any strategic decisions.
The crucial decision of the citizens is where to produce. Consider rst an economy without debt
and aid. The intertemporal welfare of a citizen in period t is
ut =
1X
=0
 t [ct+   (1  ) et+ ] , (7)
where ct+ = consumption and et+ = e¤ort by the citizen in period t+  . There is a continuum
[0; 1] of citizens (the citizen index has been dropped). If the citizen chooses to work in the formal
sector, her output is
yt+ = (et+ )
1 
; 0 <  < 1 (8)
and her total income, gross of taxes and potential debt repayments, is
If = yt+ +R (9)
where R = citizens income from a natural resource. If she chooses to work in the informal sector,
her output is
xt+ = b
 (et+ )
1 
; 0 < b < 1 (10)
and total income
Iin = xt+ +R (11)
where b is a measure of productive ine¢ ciency in the informal sector. The larger the proportion of
citizens working in the formal sector, the more e¢ cient the economy is. All taxes to be imposed are
lump sum. Under these assumptions, the optimal e¤ort in the formal sector is eft+ = 1 = output in
the formal sector, while the optimal e¤ort in the informal sector is eint+ = b = output in the informal
sector.
The utility function of the ruler is
udict =
1X
=0
 tcdict+ . (12)
If the ruler yields up her power, her consumption and utility equal 0. If she is in power, she can
only nance her consumption through taxes. She can always tax the income from the natural resource,
but otherwise she can tax citizensincome only when they produce in formal economy.
Consider rst the game between the ruler and the citizens in the absence of debt and aid. We
focus on the Markov-perfect equilibria. The only pay-o¤ relevant state variable is the political system.
When the end-of-period political system is democracy, the citizens welfare is
ut (dem) =
R+ 
1   , (13)
because the citizens do not have motives to tax themselves in this set up. The (ex-)rulers welfare
is
udict (dem) = 0: (14)
If, in contrast, the economy is still a dictatorship at the end of the period, the dictator faces tax
collection costs which are increasing in the ratio of taxes relative to the tax base.8 For simplicity, the
8For example Aizenman (2003) argues that tax collection costs are empirically signicant. One way to rationalize the
assumption made here is that tax administration has to "catch" the taxpayers who are scattered in the economy and who
can change the location of their activities. The larger taxes are relative to the tax base, the larger tax administration is
needed to collect the taxes.
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costs are linear in the ratio: C = f(taxes=tax base), 1 > f > 0. We assume, again for simplicity,
that the ruler sets either high taxes, T = 1 +R, or low taxes, T = R. Simultaneously, citizens choose
whether to work in the formal or informal sector. Bearing in mind that even if the ruler sets high
taxes, but the citizen works in the informal sector, the ruler can only collect the revenue from the
natural resource, the payo¤s are:
Ruler
Citizen
Formal Informal
High 1 +R  f;   1 R  f   1+RR  ; b
Low R  f

R
1+R

;  R  f; b
(15)
First, there is not any pure strategy equilibrium, but a mixed strategy equilibrium exists. Thus,
let p = probability that citizens choose to work in the formal sector and q = the probability that the
ruler sets high taxes. The ruler must be indi¤erent between the two tax rates:
p (1 +R  f) + (1  p)

R  f

1 +R
R

(16)
= p

R  f

R
1 +R

+ (1  p) (R  f)
giving the equilibrium citizensstrategy as
p =
f
R
1 + fR(1+R)
=
f (1 +R)
R (1 +R) + f
: (17)
Interestingly, the probability of citizens working in the formal sector goes to zero, as the resource rent
goes to innity: there is a resource curse. Similarly, in equilibrium the citizen is indi¤erent between
working in the formal or informal sector only if
q(  1) + (1  q) = qb+ (1  q)b (18)
giving the equilibrium probability of the high tax rate as
q =  (1  b) : (19)
With these probabilities, the expected ruler income is strictly positive. Hence, the ruler chooses to
stay in power.
3.2.2 The Consequences of Debt Relief
Including debt in the model makes the situation more complicated. When the economy is a democracy,
debt repayments fall on the citizens and their welfare is, assuming that they produce in the formal
sector,
ut (dem) =
R+  Gdem (rich)
1   (20)
while the rulers utility equals zero. Here Gdem (rich) = debt repayments, when all citizens produce
in the formal sector. If the citizens work in the informal sector, only resource income can be used for
debt repayment. If all the citizens work in informal economy, an expression analogous to (20) holds
for welfare. In this set-up, a citizen chooses to work in the formal sector only if R +   Gdem (rich)
 b+R Gdem (poor). This implies that debt relief focusing on poor countries may be a hindrance
to economic growth: if R   Gdem (poor) > 0, formal sector production is protable only if also R  
Gdem (rich) is large enough, that is debt relief is provided also when income level is higher. Another
means of achieving the same goal is to increase aid to countries that show growth in per capita income.
Thus, debt relief may have adverse incentive e¤ects, unless it is planned to encourage growth. Also
debt overhang problem is possible. If the debt burden in the dictatorship is large, 1+R > Gdic () > R
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and no debt relief is provided when the country switches to democracy, formal sector production is
chosen only if b < +R Gdic (). Thus, odious debt, debt given to dictators may prevent economic
development without debt relief.
In dictatorship, the same game is played between the ruler and the citizens, but the debt repayments
fall on the ruler. The equilibrium probability9 of the citizens choosing to work in the formal sector is
now
p =
f
R +G
dic(HT; poor) Gdic(LT; poor)
1 + fR(1+R) +G
dic(HT; poor) Gdic(LT; poor)  [Gdic(HT; rich) Gdic(LT; rich)] ; (21)
where HT refers to the case where the dictator sets high taxes, and LT to the case with low taxes.
Comparing (17) and (21) shows that debt relief conditioned on government policies can be used to
enlarge formal economy, while the equilibrium probabilities of choosing high or low taxes remain
unchanged. In particular, debt relief provided when the dictator chooses good, low-tax, policy increases
the size of the formal sector, improving therefore economic e¢ ciency. After all, such debt relief implies
a reduction in both Gdic(LT; poor) and Gdic(LT; rich). The same can be achieved through aid: aid
conditioned on good policies enlarges the formal sector.
Consider next the case with 1 + R > Gdic () > R. Then, if the citizens choose to work in the
informal sector or low taxes are chosen, the ruler cannot meet the scheduled repayments and can only
pay R. The equilibrium probability of citizens choosing the formal sector production becomes
p =
f
R
1 + fR(1+R)   [Gdic(HT; rich) R]
: (22)
In this special case, higher debt burden improves economic e¢ ciency. At the same time, resource
curse becomes more serious. This is in contrast with the mild debt burden case (equation (21)), where
increased debt burden could improve or reduce e¢ ciency. Finally, with severe enough debt burden the
dictator can never achieve high enough income to get higher utility by staying in power than by giving
power to the citizens: debt burden can initiate political change. This political change will improve
e¢ ciency, if accompanied with debt relief.
To recapitulate the main results thus far: debt can interact interestingly with the political regime
and a¤ect productive e¢ ciency through this channel. With a moderate debt burden, increases in debt
may reduce productive e¢ ciency under autocratic regime. The reverse happens when the debt burden
is severe. Debt burden can also lead to a political change and birth of democracy if the donors behave
properly. In democracy, debt burden can lead to productive ine¢ ciency if it is severe enough. Thus,
debt relief when a country becomes democratic can be a reasonable policy.
3.2.3 The Role of Aid
Let us now nally add aid to the model. Because aid directed to the dictator has similar e¤ects
with debt relief, such aid (or fungible aid given to the citizens) conditioned on good policy improves
e¢ ciency. Thus, consider non-fungible aid given to the citizens. Obviously, it does not a¤ect the choice
of the sector of production. Instead, it has an impact on the choice of tax policy, and the equilibrium
probability of high taxes becomes
q =
(1  b) +Adic (LT; rich) Adic (LT; poor)
1 +Adic (HT; poor) +Adic (LT; rich)  [Adic (LT; poor) +Adic (HT; rich)] ; (23)
where A() denotes aid given to the private sector. (23) shows that the more selective aid is in the
sense of being conditioned on private sector poverty, that is the larger A (LT; poor) and A (HT; poor)
are, the smaller is the probability that policies are unfavourable. Thus, aid given to the dictator
and conditioned on good policies and aid given to the private sector and conditioned on poverty can
9We assume here and in the following subsection that debt and aid do not change the nature of the equilibrium and
do not produce additional equilibria. This is done to highlight that, even with this simplication, the implications of
debt and aid on e¢ ciency depend on details.
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mutually reinforce each other. Increased aid can then either reduce or improve productive e¢ ciency
and improve or worsen policies, when the political system is autocracy.
The same holds for democracy, but with an interesting twist. In democracy, if Gdem < R, citizens
choose to produce in the formal sector only if
R+  Gdem +Adem (rich)  R+ b Gdem +Adem (poor) (24)
,
 (1  b)  Adem (poor) Adem (rich) :
Thus, aid too much conditioned on poverty may reduce e¢ ciency: (24) would not hold. Unconditional
aid with debt relief (if needed) is consistent with e¢ ciency.
Altogether, the theory implies that interactions between aid, debt, institutions, and donor be-
haviour a¤ect productive e¢ ciency. The interactions are not straightforward, however. Policies that
improve e¢ ciency when the economy is autocratically led may have a negative impact in democracy.
Autocracy includes in the present setting a very corrupted democratic regime where a large part of
the income is absorbed by a small class of policymakers and bureaucrats. The overall conclusion is
then that one should control for aid, debt, and policy with multiplicative terms in the empirical part..
An additional implication of the model is that both with and without aid and debt, the economy
can be caught in an "ine¢ ciency trap". First, a dictatorship will not become a democracy without
aid and debt. Because e¢ ciency would be higher in democracy without informal economy, this will
result in ine¢ ciency. Second, debt and aid can reduce e¢ ciency even in a democracy. The model of
Acemoglu et al. (2006) is also consistent with the existence of an ine¢ ciency trap. By controlling for
aid, debt, and institutional quality in empirical estimations, we can control for the variable creating
the trap, but only partially.
4 Empirical Analysis
Our analysis di¤ers from the earlier literature by concentrating on the impact debt and aid have on
technical e¢ ciency: we study whether debt and aid contribute to aggregate economic e¢ ciency by
improving poor countriesuse of available technologies. To do that, we need a measure of e¢ ciency.
One possible approach is that followed by Acemoglu et al. (2006), who measure the distance to frontier
by international di¤erences to US labour productivity, so that US economy alone determines the world
technology frontier. Instead of making that assumption, we use data envelopment analysis (DEA)
as explained in introduction, and let the group of e¢ cient countries jointly determine the e¢ cient
frontier. The scores given to individual countries measure the distance of a country from the world
production frontier. Kök and Deliktas¸ (2004) use the same approach, but concentrate on transition
economies instead of a wider set of developing economies. Their results, based on regressing the average
e¢ ciency change on initial e¢ ciency, aid, foreign direct investment and an index of democratization,
indicate that aid had a positive impact on the average e¢ ciency change in transition economies during
1991-2002. However, Kök and Deliktas¸ do not account for the endogeneity of aid.
Another option closely associated with DEA would have been to use stochastic frontier analysis.
Hermes et al. (2006) use this method to explain the impact of aid on technical e¢ ciency. They have
data on 38 developing countries, while we rely on a slightly larger data set. Moreover, our set of
controls is more extensive.
4.1 Data
Our dependent variable is the change in (log) e¢ ciency. Haaparanta and Virta (2007) calculate DEA
e¢ ciency scores for 83 countries, of which 25 belong to the group of high-income countries, with 5-year
intervals between years 1980 and 2000. The use of the original e¢ ciency scores would, therefore, leave
us with only four 5-year periods with further reductions in periods when the aim is at explaining change,
and when regressors are meant to include the lagged dependent variable. To overcome this problem,
we expand the original data set of Haaparanta and Virta to cover years 1978-2001, and concentrate on
4-year periods (1978-1981, 1982-1985, 1986-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997, 1998-2001) instead of 5-year
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periods. We also calculate the e¢ ciency scores for 2002 to be able to explain the change in e¢ ciency
between years 1998 and 2002.
As to the other variables used in the regressions, initial GDP per capita, population growth,
schooling measured by the mean years of secondary schooling among those over 25, budget surplus,
updated Sachs-Warner indicator of openness, both of the two aid measures, as well as the index of
institutional quality originate from a data set collected by Roodman (2004). The data set comprises
many of the variables that have traditionally been used to analyse the role played by aid and utilises
various sources. We add variables necessary for our purposes, the most important addition being the
level of debt. To measure debt, initial external debt per GDP and total debt service per exports
from WDI Online database (World Bank 2006) are used as well as the net present value of debt from
Dikhanov (2007). Other variables from the World Bank include gross xed capital formation per GDP,
foreign direct investment per GDP, and growth rate of net barter terms of trade (which is also based
on authorscalculations). Data on Frankel and Rose trade instrument originates from Andrew Roses
home page (see also Frankel and Rose 2002). More detailed variable descriptions and data sources
(Table A.1) as well as descriptive statistics (Table A.2) are presented in Appendix A.1.
As is commonly done in cross-country growth studies, annual observations are transformed into
period averages of ows and initial observations of stocks. The resulting data set is an unbalanced panel
covering e¢ ciency changes from 1978-1982 to 1998-2002. Appendix A.2 lists the countries included in
the analysis.
4.2 Methodological Issues
There are at least two methodological issues that need special attention. First, it is not straightforward
to use e¢ ciency scores calculated by data envelopment analysis as a left hand side variable (Simar and
Wilson 2000, 2006). There are several potential problems here. The rst one is that e¢ ciency scores
lie between zero and one. Since we focus on the change in e¢ ciency scores (change in logs, more
specically), we avoid that problem here. The other problem, identied by Simar and Wilson, is
that e¢ ciency estimates calculated by DEA are serially correlated. Thus, if one tries to explain the
e¢ ciency levels, standard statistical inference is not valid. We hope to mitigate the problem by focusing
on the change in e¢ ciency estimates. Also, we do not use the whole sample of countries for which
the e¢ ciency scores are calculated, but a subsample consisting of those developing countries that have
received foreign aid. As the residuals of our regressions discussed below are not autocorrelated within
a period10 , our approach seems to work. Finally, possible endogeneity of the regressors needs to be
taken into account. This necessitates a careful choice of the estimation method.
As is well known (Caselli et al. 1996), growth equations tend to be characterised by dynamics
and endogenous regressors. Hansen and Tarp (2001) nd that also most of the explanatory variables
recently used in the literature on the e¤ects of aid on growth are endogenous. They suspect, particu-
larly, that aid is not exogenous with respect to growth and question whether it is even predetermined
in a typical cross-country regression with variables averaged over four or ve years. As GDP gures
have been used to compile the e¢ ciency scores, it is more than likely that the same applies to the
equations estimated here. This implies that neither generalised least squares nor xed e¤ect estimator
will produce consistent estimates (Bond 2002).
One solution to the problem is to use the dynamic panel general method of moments (GMM)
estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991), also called di¤erence GMM. As discussed in more detail below,
it is an instrumental variables estimator that uses suitable lags of the predetermined and endogenous
variables as instruments for those predetermined and endogenous variables in rst di¤erences. Using
the estimator requires that the error terms are not serially correlated. Another option is Blundell
and Bond system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998). System GMM estimator adds the
original equations in levels to the system of rst-di¤erenced equations. The validity of the additional
instruments hinges on the assumption that changes in the instrumenting variables are uncorrelated with
the xed e¤ects. Di¤erence-in-Sargan test can be used to test the validity of a subset of instruments (see
for example Roodman 2006). Di¤erence and system GMM estimators are discussed in the connection
10Test results are available upon request.
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of debt and growth by Presbitero (2005), Cordella et al. (2005), and Pattillo et al. (2004), and in the
context of aid and growth by Dalgaard et al. (2004) among others.
4.3 Results from Di¤erence and System GMM Estimations
We base our estimations on Pattillo et al. (2004) and add regressors that should not be neglected
according to our theory. As discussed above, Pattillo et al. nd that TFP growth is negatively
a¤ected by lagged income per capita, while it seems to be positively a¤ected by human capital and
investment, as well as by budget balance and openness. The role played by debt/income ratio seems
to be non-linear. Only lagged income and budget balance are signicant in all regressions. Pattillo et
al. control for the level of debt, but do not take aid into account. This is where we depart from their
approach: we try to account for the impacts of aid as well as debt and try also to examine the role of
possible non-linearities.
The equation to be estimated is
4eit = + ei;t 1 +
kX
j=1
jxjit + i + "it with (25)
E [i] = E ["it] = E [i"it] = 0
where eit is the logarithm of the DEA e¢ ciency score of country i at time t, xjit is the set of control
variables, including aid and debt, and i is an unobserved country-specic time-invariant e¤ect, and
"it is a disturbance term. Di¤erencing removes the country-specic e¤ects and leads to
4eit  4ei;t 1 =  (ei;t 1   ei;t 2) +
kX
j=1
j (xjit   xji;t 1) + "it   "i;t 1: (26)
Although predetermined variables become endogenous in rst di¤erences, deeper lags are potential
instruments. Di¤erence GMM uses this attribute and instruments the predetermined and endogenous
variables11 in rst di¤erences with suitable lags of their levels. Therefore, xjit is a vector of current
and lagged values of explanatory variables. The result is a system of equations with one equation for
each time period. However, if e is near random walk, ei;t 1 is a poor instrument for 4eit (Blundell
and Bond 1998). In such a case, system GMM performs better. As mentioned above, system GMM
adds the original equations in levels into the system. The predetermined and endogenous variables in
levels are then instrumented with suitable lags of their own rst di¤erences. The main assumption is
that E[i4"it] = 0, meaning that the country-specic e¤ects should not be correlated with changes in
the disturbance term.
Both di¤erence and system GMM estimators have one- and two-step variations. The one-step
GMM estimator is only e¢ cient under homoskedasticity and uncorrelated error terms, while the two-
step estimator is asymptotically more e¢ cient (Presbitero 2005). The latter exploits the residuals from
the one-step estimate and uses a consistent estimate of the weighting matrix (Davidson and McKinnon
2004). However, the two-step estimates of the standard errors tend to be downward biased (Arellano
and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998). This can be compensated for by using a nite-sample
correction for the asymptotic variance of the two-step GMM estimator of Windmeijer (2005). This
correction is built into the Stata module xtabond2 by Roodman (2005), and is used here in all the
two-step regressions. In addition, small sample statistics are reported throughout.
The number of instruments is quadratic in T , which can lead to problems because too many
instruments tend to overt endogenous variables. Therefore, the number of lags of the instrumenting
variable is restricted to lags 1 and 2 in the transformed equation and lag 0 in the levels equation for
predetermined variables. As to endogenous variables, we follow a standard treatment and use lags 2
11As dened in Bond (2002), a variable xit is endogenous, if it is correlated with "it and earlier shocks, but uncorrelated
with "i;t+1 and subsequent shocks. It is predetermined if it is uncorrelated with "it but correlated with "i;t 1 and earlier
shocks. If xit is exogenous, it is uncorrelated with all past, present and future realizations of "is.
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and 3 in the transformed equation and lag 1 in the levels equation. Moreover, the set of instruments
is collapsed in a manner described in Roodman (2006).
Table 1 presents the regressions most closely based on Pattillo et al. (2004). Uneven columns use
di¤erence GMM, while even columns use system GMM. Constant is only included in the latter, because
it is automatically dropped from di¤erence GMM estimations. The two-step estimator with the nite-
sample correction of Windmeijer is used in all the regressions, while some test statistics are presented
at the bottom of the table. The dependent variable is the change in log e¢ ciency. As in all of our
specications, the controls include lagged e¢ ciency change, log initial e¢ ciency and log initial income
per capita. Population growth, human capital as measured by mean years of secondary schooling
among those over 25, gross capital formation relative to GDP, budget balance, Sachs-Warner measure
of openness, terms of trade growth and the level of debt are taken from Pattillo et al. (although data
sources vary). To these, we add foreign direct investment relative to GDP and lagged aid, as well as
an interaction term of aid and debt.12 Our primary aid variable is e¤ective development assistance
divided by real GDP from Roodman (2004), but we test for the robustness of the results by using the
ratio of net overseas development assistance and real GDP also from Roodman. In the spirit of Hansen
and Tarp (2001), we lag aid by one period. This policy is also followed when interaction terms of aid
and other variables are built. As to debt, we use both the face value of debt stocks and the present
value of debt. Period dummies are included to control for time and to make the assumption of no
correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances more likely to hold (Roodman 2006).
12Because of the existing evidence of non-linearities of the impacts of aid and debt, we initially included also aid and
debt squared in the regressions with the result that correlation between the squared variables and the variables in levels
had a large, and apparently misleading, impact on the results.
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Table 1. Difference and system GMM regressions on the impacts of aid and debt on efficiency change
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6
difference GMM system GMM difference GMM system GMM difference GMM system GMM
Efficiency change (lagged) 0.125 0.174 0.07 0.166 0.064 0.156
(1.48) (1.97)* (0.63) (1.73)* (0.7) (2.10)**
Log initial efficiency -0.537 -0.261 -0.522 -0.215 -0.5 -0.218
(4.76)*** (2.27)** (3.91)*** (2.44)** (2.85)*** (2.59)**
Log initial real GDP / capita -0.511 0.037 -0.553 0.082 -0.538 0.101
(2.90)*** (0.57) (3.38)*** (1.53) (2.79)*** (2.23)**
Population growth 0.091 0.089 0.096 0.085 0.093 0.089
(2.85)*** (2.05)** (3.86)*** (2.32)** (4.37)*** (2.04)**
Schooling 0.271 0.036 0.395 0.015 0.369 0.005
(1.02) (0.71) (2.18)** (0.3) (1.98)* (0.14)
Gross fixed capital formation / GDP -0.015 -0.013 -0.017 -0.014 -0.018 -0.014
(1.5) (1.98)* (2.02)** (4.22)*** (2.41)* (3.84)***
Foreign direct investment / GDP 0.001 0.009 0.018 0.001 0.02 -0.004
(0.02) (0.74) (0.72) (0.09) (0.7) (0.34)
Growth rate of net barter terms of trade 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.66) (0.57) (1.07) (0.83) (0.93) (1.1)
Budget surplus -1.794 -0.234 -1.47 -1.068 -1.371 -0.889
(1.58) (0.25) (1.43) (1.78)* (1.58) (1.25)
Sachs-Warner 0.006 0.029 0.006 -0.02 -0.003 0.01
(0.11) (0.57) (0.07) (0.41) (0.04) (0.21)
Total debt service / exports -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0
(0.28) (0.26) (0.28) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07)
Aid (lagged) 0.02 -0.016 0.044 -0.025 0.04 -0.018
(1.25) (0.94) (1.77)* (1.34) (1.98)* (1.05)
Aid (lagged) * initial external debt / GDP 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009
(0.6) (1.04) (0.81) (2.27)** (0.86) (2.00)*
Aid (lagged) * policy -0.003 0.011
(0.49) (2.29)**
Debt * policy -0.002 0.008
(0.66) (1.95)*
s1982 -0.021 0.051 0.053 -0.014 0.052 -0.001
(0.17) (0.69) (0.38) (0.24) (0.44) (0.02)
s1986 -0.115 -0.088 -0.058 -0.132 -0.058 -0.125
(1.09) (1.63) (0.46) (3.14)*** (0.51) (2.81)***
s1990 -0.082 -0.03 -0.048 -0.044 -0.048 -0.046
(1.24) (0.92) (0.74) (1.59) (0.72) (1.73)*
s1994 -0.021 0.01 -0.008 0.013 -0.009 0.006
(0.63) (0.49) (0.23) (0.76) (0.28) (0.37)
Constant -0.348 -0.597 -0.756
(0.79) (1.46) (2.00)*
t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Observations 162 215 158 210 158 210
Number of groups 47 48 45 48 45 48
Number of instruments 28 41 30 44 30 44
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (P-value) 0.497 0.372 0.212 0.702 0.226 0.813
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (P-value) 0.656 0.193 0.733 0.692 0.738 0.582
Difference-in-Sargan test (P-value)
GMM instruments for levels 0.384 0.884 0.705
Predetermined instruments 0.242 0.715 0.658
Endogenous instruments 0.839 0.820 0.815
Notes: Null hypotheses of the tests are as follows: Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation: null = no autocorrelation; Hansen test: null = the set of instruments
is valid; difference-in-Sargan test: null = the level moment conditions imposed in system GMM are valid.
The rst regression in Table 1 implies that log initial e¢ ciency has a negative impact on e¢ ciency
change, meaning that the impact of initial DEA score is positive. Opposite result would have been more
intuitive given the upper limit of e¢ ciency: countries already e¢ cient or otherwise close to the world
technology frontier have little room for improvement. But, as discussed above in the theory section,
an "ine¢ ciency trap" can exist. With some countries caught in such a trap, higher initial e¢ ciency
could imply higher future e¢ ciency, and low initial e¢ ciency low e¢ ciency also in the future. Our
results indicate that improvements in e¢ ciency are relatively larger at low levels of initial e¢ ciency.
This is also consistent with the existence of an ine¢ ciency trap: one would expect that once countries
get out of the trap, their e¢ ciency initially increases fast.
Of the other signicant regressors, population growth seems to have a positive impact on e¢ ciency
change. One possible interpretation of this result is that growth in population is a proxy for improved
health. Another, complementary interpretation is that the coe¢ cient captures factors such as an end
of civil war. Finally, the result may reect "population pressure": with more mouths to feed one must
use existing production facilities more e¢ ciently. As to the variables of interest, neither aid nor debt
seems to be signicant in determining the e¢ ciency change in any of the di¤erence GMM estimations
of columns 1, 3 and 5. Hansen J statistic test for over-identifying restrictions indicates that the set of
instruments is valid, and Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in rst di¤erences implies that the error terms
in levels are not serially correlated, as required.
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Regression 2 presents the results with system GMM.13 The positive relationships between e¢ ciency
change and initial e¢ ciency, and e¢ ciency change and population growth hold even with the additional
instruments in levels. The negative impact of investment rate now apparent is not surprising: because
DEA scores use physical capital stock as an input, larger stock may result in ine¢ ciency in the use
of inputs. Instead, if there is shortage of physical capital, it will probably be used more e¢ ciently
(Haaparanta and Virta 2007).
Regressions 3 and 4 incorporate an interaction term of aid and policy14 because earlier literature,
most notably Burnside and Dollar (2000), has implied that policy might play a role. According to
system GMM regression 4, the impact of aid is signicantly linked to the policies followed by the
recipient country. Moreover, aid and debt are jointly signicant with a positive impact on e¢ ciency
change. For completeness, regressions 5 and 6 incorporate interaction between debt and policy instead
of that of aid and policy. The interaction term aid  debt is again signicant and positive, as is also
the impact of debt  policy:
Table 2 presents one-step results for the system GMM regressions of Table 1. The impacts of initial
e¢ ciency, population growth and investment are as in Table 1, and the joint impact of aid and initial
debt is now signicant in all three regressions.
13Di¤erence-in-Sargan test results at the bottom of the table imply that system GMM can be used.
14Policy is dened as in Burnside and Dollar (2000), that is policy = 6.85 * budget balance - 1.4 * ination + 2.16 *
Sachs-Warner.
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Table 2. One-step system GMM regressions on the impacts of aid and debt on efficiency change
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
system GMM system GMM system GMM
Efficiency change (lagged) 0.146 0.125 0.126
(2.46)** (1.97)* (2.02)**
Log initial efficiency -0.22 -0.168 -0.181
(3.16)*** (2.05)** (2.64)**
Log initial real GDP / capita 0.013 0.057 0.074
(0.3) (1.15) (1.74)*
Population growth 0.085 0.084 0.086
(2.28)** (2.23)** (2.30)**
Schooling 0.049 0.039 0.022
(1.44) (1.19) (0.67)
Gross fixed capital formation / GDP -0.011 -0.013 -0.013
(2.49)** (2.96)*** (3.79)***
Foreign direct investment / GDP 0.009 -0.001 -0.004
(0.75) (0.12) (0.36)
Growth rate of net barter terms of trade 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.08) (1.06) (1.23)
Budget surplus -0.121 -0.581 -0.42
(0.21) (1.15) (0.84)
Sachs-Warner 0.018 -0.042 -0.018
(0.36) (1.06) (0.38)
Total debt service / exports 0 0 0
(0.11) (0.16) (0.12)
Aid (lagged) -0.014 -0.018 -0.014
(1.2) (1.22) (1.05)
Aid (lagged) * initial external debt / GDP 0.005 0.007 0.009
(1.72)* (3.09)*** (2.10)**
Aid (lagged) * policy 0.008
(1.17)
Debt * policy 0.007
(1.93)*
s1982 0.048 -0.007 -0.002
(0.87) (0.14) (0.04)
s1986 -0.104 -0.139 -0.137
(2.42)** (3.46)*** (3.19)***
s1990 -0.04 -0.058 -0.058
(1.15) (1.71) (1.75)*
s1994 0.006 0.007 0.004
(0.33) (0.43) (0.22)
Constant -0.207 -0.409 -0.552
(0.62) (1) (1.55)
t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Observations 215 210 210
Number of groups 48 48 48
Number of instruments 41 44 44
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (P-value) 0.223 0.709 0.717
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (P-value) 0.193 0.692 0.582
Difference-in-Sargan test (P-value)
GMM instruments for levels 0.384 0.884 0.705
Predetermined instruments 0.242 0.715 0.658
Endogenous instruments 0.839 0.82 0.815
Notes: Null hypotheses of the tests are as follows: Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation: null = no autocorrelation;
 Hansen test: null = the set of instruments is valid; difference-in-Sargan test: null = the level moment conditions
imposed in system GMM are valid.
Because budget balance is quite a narrow indicator of institutional quality and because it is already
included in Burnside-Dollar policy measure, regressions in Table 3 replace it by a composite index of
institutional quality from ICRG. The index measures the level of corruption, bureaucratic quality, and
rule of law and is increasing in institutional quality. Moreover, because Sachs-Warner index of openness
is also a part of the Burnside-Dollar policy measure, Frankel and Rose (2002) trade instrument based on
a gravity model is used here. However, because Frankel-Rose instrument is only calculated for the year
1990, it is time-invariant, and is automatically dropped from di¤erence GMM estimations. Otherwise,
the sets of instruments are unchanged. All in all, the results are in line with Table 1. Initial e¢ ciency
and investment are the most robust determinants of e¢ ciency change, the former with a positive
(remembering that log initial e¢ ciency is included in the regressions) and the latter with a negative
impact on e¢ ciency. The interaction term of aid and debt is only signicant in regression 2, while it
is almost signicant and of the same magnitude in regressions 4 and 6. Also the joint impact of aid
and policy seems to be signicant with a positive coe¢ cient.
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Table 3. Difference and system GMM regressions on the impacts of aid and debt on efficiency change
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6
difference GMM system GMM difference GMM system GMM difference GMM system GMM
Efficiency change (lagged) -0.003 0.181 0.166 0.123 0.162 0.143
(0.02) (1.98)* (1.73)* (1.02) (1.52) (1.4)
Log initial efficiency -0.441 -0.179 -0.477 -0.295 -0.44 -0.259
(3.22)*** (2.32)** (4.23)*** (3.29)*** (4.12)*** (2.85)***
Log initial real GDP / capita -0.528 0 -0.343 0.037 -0.33 0.079
(1.71)* (0) (1.53) (0.62) (1.45) (1.27)
Population growth 0.027 -0.007 0.068 0.011 0.048 0.02
(0.61) (0.22) (2.09)** (0.34) (1.18) (0.53)
Schooling 0.075 0.051 0.228 0.04 0.138 0.015
(0.38) (1.04) (1.22) (0.73) (0.72) (0.34)
Gross fixed capital formation / GDP -0.02 -0.013 -0.009 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013
(1.71)* (3.39)*** (1.28) (3.35)*** (1.5) (3.27)***
Foreign direct investment / GDP -0.011 -0.003 -0.028 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008
(0.41) (0.25) (0.91) (0.76) (0.28) (0.93)
Growth rate of net barter terms of trade 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.49) (1.41) (0.6) (1.31) (1.06) (1.88)*
ICRG -0.03 -0.011 -0.031 -0.019 -0.027 -0.016
(1.61) (0.84) (2.10)** (1.35) (1.53) (1.17)
Frankel-Rose 0.651 -0.174 -0.078
(0.56) (0.1) (0.05)
Total debt service / exports -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.001
(0.32) (0.25) (0.48) (0.45) (0.02) (0.57)
Aid (lagged) 0.004 -0.022 0.003 -0.026 0.012 -0.011
(0.18) (1.74)* (0.13) (1.35) (0.52) (0.6)
Aid (lagged) * initial external debt / GDP 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.006
(0.93) (1.75)* (0.1) (1.18) (1.02) (1.44)
Aid (lagged) * policy 0.003 0.016
(0.5) (2.07)**
Debt * policy 0 0.007
(0.01) (1.68)
s1982 -0.05 0.068 -0.059 0.035 -0.021 0.015
(0.38) (1.37) (0.6) (0.56) (0.26) (0.35)
s1986 -0.168 -0.069 -0.169 -0.07 -0.133 -0.096
(1.56) (1.68)* (1.78)* (1.31) (1.88)* (2.68)**
s1990 -0.141 -0.016 -0.112 -0.03 -0.084 -0.041
(1.69)* (0.55) (1.68)* (0.86) (1.69)* (1.86)*
s1994 -0.018 0.026 -0.011 0.014 -0.004 0.007
(0.36) (1.13) (0.38) (0.53) (0.16) (0.38)
Constant 0.16 -0.07 -0.408
(0.44) (0.16) (1.16)
t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Observations 178 229 146 195 146 195
Number of groups 49 49 42 45 42 45
Number of instruments 28 40 30 43 30 43
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (P-value) 0.764 0.328 0.917 0.737 0.687 0.672
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (P-value) 0.385 0.545 0.825 0.667 0.554 0.651
Difference-in-Sargan test (P-value)
GMM instruments for levels 0.387 0.776 0.671
Predetermined instruments 0.522 0.619 0.482
Endogenous instruments 0.875 0.696 0.921
Notes: Null hypotheses of the tests are as follows: Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation: null = no autocorrelation; Hansen test: null = the set of instruments
is valid; difference-in-Sargan test: null = the level moment conditions imposed in system GMM are valid.
To summarise, the results indicate that initial e¢ ciency and investment rate are most robustly
associated with e¢ ciency change. The impact of initial e¢ ciency is positive, which implies that it may
be di¢ cult to catch up in e¢ ciency if the initial level of e¢ ciency is low: an ine¢ ciency trap may
exist. Even if we have controlled for aid, debt and the standard measures of policy and institutions,
these are bound to capture the phenomena only partially. For example, they do not capture all the
possible ways dictatorships could create the trap, and they capture only a subset of institutional
variables. But, despite all the caveats, our results provide quite strong evidence for the existence of
"ine¢ ciency traps". As to the result on the negative impact of investment rate, it is intuitive in the
sense that too heavy investment in physical capital may lead to overcapacity. Physical capital is then
used less e¢ ciently than it could be used under other circumstances. In support of the results of
Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004), aid  policy is signicant and positive nearly always when it enters
system GMM estimations. Also high level of debt, combined with a good policy environment, might
increase technical e¢ ciency. Strong policies might, therefore, mitigate the negative incentive e¤ects of
expected debt service. Interestingly, evidence of the joint signicance of foreign aid and initial debt is
also rather strong particularly with budget balance as the measure of institutional quality and Sachs-
Warner measure of trade openness. The positive coe¢ cient of the term indicates that aid and debt
have jointly a positive impact on e¢ ciency.
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4.4 Robustness Checks
If net overseas development assistance (ODA) divided by real GDP is used as the aid variable instead
of e¤ective development assistance per real GDP15 , changes in the results of Table 1 are only minor:
initial e¢ ciency, population growth, and investment are still the most robust determinants of e¢ ciency
change. Also the result concerning the joint signicance of aid and initial debt seems to hold: the
interaction term is signicant and positive if either aid  policy or debt  policy is included in system
GMM regressions. The results with the ICRG measure of institutional quality and Frankel-Rose trade
instrument presented in Table 3 remain also relatively unchanged with ODA: although aid  debt is
not signicant at 10 percent risk level in any of the regressions, it is always positive and close to
being signicant. If one-step regressions are run instead of two-step regressions, aiddebt is signicant
in regression 1 and with debt  policy. Moreover, aid  policy tends to be signicant whenever it is
included in system GMM estimations. To summarise, the joint impact of aid and policy seems to be
more important than that of aid and debt, but even the latter cannot be ruled out despite the use of
ODA.
With present value of debt from Dikhanov (2007) as the measure of initial debt, initial e¢ ciency
and investment are still signicant with similar impacts as before. In system GMM estimations based
on Table 1, aid  debt is signicant and positive both in one- and two-step variations if aid  policy is
included in the analysis but is not signicant otherwise. As before, aid  policy is also signicant and
positive. As to the results of Table 3, aiddebt is insignicant in all two-step system GMM estimations
unlike aidpolicy, which is again signicant. In one-step regressions, the joint impact of aid and initial
debt is signicant in the regression including debt  policy. All in all, it seems that the interaction
term of aid and initial debt is signicant less often with present value of debt than with the nominal
value, but its coe¢ cient is still positive and of the same magnitude. Therefore, it seems that the use
of present value debt does not completely undermine the joint importance of aid and initial debt. On
the other hand, the case for positive impact of aid under good policies is as strong as ever.
So far, we have only used measures of institutional quality and openness as control variables. It is,
however, possible, that also geography could play a role in determining the impacts of aid and debt
(see for example Dalgaard et al. 2004). To examine whether geography indeed is important, we add
tropical area fraction of a country from Roodman (2004) into the analysis. The results are presented
in Table 4, which is otherwise based on Table 3. Only system GMM results are presented, because
tropical area fraction is time-invariant and disappears, therefore, from di¤erence GMM estimations.
The results of both two-step (regressions 1-3) and one-step (regressions 4-6) estimations imply that
tropical area fraction is not signicant. Instead, initial e¢ ciency and investment enter signicantly and
with familiar signs. The new aspect raised by the addition of tropical area fraction is the signicance
of the growth rate of net barter terms of trade, which is now signicant and positive in ve out of six
regressions, implying that external shocks are also important in determining e¢ ciency change. There
is again some evidence of the joint signicance of aid and initial debt. Also aidpolicy is signicant and
positive, meaning that tropical area fraction did not change the results in any major way. Therefore,
institutions (or policy) and, in this case, also trade, seem to prevail over geography.
15The results are available upon request.
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Table 4. System GMM regressions with tropical area fraction
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6
two-step two-step two-step one-step one-step one-step
Efficiency change (lagged) 0.189 0.136 0.168 0.146 0.126 0.126
(2.20)** -1.12 -1.44 (1.8)* -1.43 -1.49
Log initial efficiency -0.161 -0.329 -0.271 -0.145 -0.322 -0.271
-1.67 (3.83)*** (2.58)** (2.25)** (3.51)*** (3.51)***
Log initial real GDP / capita 0.044 0.04 0.082 0.025 0.033 0.055
-0.77 -0.69 -1.42 -0.47 -0.58 -1.22
Population growth -0.007 -0.011 0.012 -0.01 -0.007 0.008
-0.23 -0.34 -0.3 -0.3 -0.29 -0.29
Schooling 0.018 0.02 0.005 0.054 0.046 0.03
-0.36 -0.32 -0.11 -1.34 -1.24 -1.02
Gross fixed capital formation / GDP -0.014 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 -0.013
(3.76)*** (3.67)*** (3.13)*** (4.65)*** (4.52)*** (4.76)***
Foreign direct investment / GDP -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.009 -0.002 -0.007
-0.47 -0.05 -0.5 -0.96 -0.19 -0.74
Growth rate of net barter terms of trade 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
(1.97)* -1.56 (2.34)** (2.57)** (1.99)* (2.36)**
ICRG -0.005 -0.018 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015
-0.45 -1.25 -1.15 -1.02 -1.43 -1.35
Frankel-Rose 0.361 -0.264 -0.314 0.105 0.268 -0.193
-0.32 -0.17 -0.21 -0.08 -0.19 -0.17
Total debt service / exports 0.001 0 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
-0.55 -0.02 -0.36 -1.06 -0.29 -0.34
Aid (lagged) -0.016 -0.027 -0.01 -0.006 -0.023 -0.005
-1.28 -1.36 -0.52 -0.52 -1.44 -0.48
Aid (lagged) * initial external debt / GDP 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.011 0.009
-1.43 (1.86)* -1.53 -1.07 (2.12)** (2.07)**
Aid (lagged) * policy 0.018 0.017
(2.22)** (2.54)**
Debt * policy 0.008 0.006
-1.5 (1.99)*
Tropical area fraction -0.032 -0.045 -0.031 -0.02 -0.012 -0.027
-0.87 -1.01 -0.63 -0.46 -0.35 -0.79
s1982 0.044 0.078 0.03 0.052 0.072 0.041
-0.8 -1.12 -0.61 -1.12 -1.32 -1.01
s1986 -0.09 -0.035 -0.085 -0.097 -0.058 -0.092
(2.00)* -0.61 (2.15)** (2.41)** -1.32 (2.53)**
s1990 -0.022 -0.006 -0.034 -0.027 -0.01 -0.027
-0.71 -0.16 -1.51 -0.84 -0.31 -0.96
s1994 0.02 0.02 0.007 0.047 0.02 0.014
-0.84 -0.8 -0.36 (2.02)** -1.03 -0.77
Constant -0.097 0.004 -0.373 0.077 -0.065 -0.22
-0.24 -0.01 -1 -0.19 -0.13 -0.62
t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Observations 225 194 194 225 194 194
Number of groups 48 44 44 48 44 44
Number of instruments 41 44 44 41 44 44
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (P-value) 0.435 0.646 0.542 0.478 0.753 0.509
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (P-value) 0.551 0.662 0.655 0.551 0.662 0.655
Difference-in-Sargan test (P-value)
GMM instruments for levels 0.491 0.875 0.667 0.491 0.875 0.667
Predetermined instruments 0.449 0.624 0.541 0.449 0.624 0.541
Endogenous instruments 0.647 0.722 0.968 0.647 0.722 0.968
Notes: Null hypotheses of the tests are as follows: Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation: null = no autocorrelation; Hansen test:
null = the set of instruments is valid; difference-in-Sargan test: null = the level moment conditions imposed in system GMM are valid.
As suggested by Roodman (2006), the regressions were also run with forward orthogonal deviations
instead of di¤erencing. As opposed to di¤erencing, which subtracts the previous observation from the
current observation of a variable, this alternative transformation subtracts the average of all future
available observations of a variable. Therefore, the approach minimises data loss and maximises the
sample size. The results discussed above are robust to this transformation.
5 Conclusion
Although previous literature on the impacts of both foreign aid and debt is abundant, many questions
remain unanswered. First, the results have been conicting. The empirical methods used have also
been lacking. Moreover, the studies have often focused only on aid or debt, and not on both at the
same time. The research has also concentrated mostly on the e¤ects on growth with the components
of growth receiving less attention. Especially changes in technical e¢ ciency have hardly been studied.
Because the results of Haaparanta and Virta (2007) imply that they might have had a signicant, and
positive e¤ect on labour productivity in developing countries, and particularly so in highly indebted
poor countries, examining technical e¢ ciency should not be neglected.
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The purpose of this paper was to contribute to the literature on aid and debt by focusing on that
particular growth component, technical e¢ ciency, and its changes in aid-recipient countries. First, two
models were built to show theoretically that interactions between aid, debt, institutions and donor
behaviour a¤ect aggregate productive e¢ ciency. The model concentrating on nancial constraints
indicated, rst, that the connection between debt and growth may di¤er in countries with di¤erent
levels of debt and, second, that severeness of debt burden may also a¤ect aid e¤ectiveness in improving
technical e¢ ciency. The second model incorporated two political aspects: the rulers decision of
whether to stay in power of not, and the rulers decision about the level of taxes. The overall conclusions
drawn from this framework were that interactions between debt (relief), aid, policy, and e¢ ciency are
complicated and that interaction terms of these factors are necessary in empirical work.
The aim of the empirical part was to apply methodology allowing for the endogeneity of several
regressors, while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of explaining e¢ ciency as measured by data
envelopment analysis. The system GMM estimations building partly on a set of regressors used by
Pattillo et al. (2004) implied that the joint impact of foreign aid and initial debt on e¢ ciency change
could be signicant and positive. However, the joint impact of aid and policy seemed to be even more
signicant. The results support, therefore, the ndings of Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004): aid seems
to have a positive impact on e¢ ciency, but only in an environment with good policies. All in all,
the results seem to conrm that it is important to include interactions of various factors in empirical
estimations. As suspected in Haaparanta and Virta (2007), the analysis indicated also that e¢ ciency
improvement could have been kind of mandatory in some cases: with a low investment rate, it has been
necessary to use the existing resources as e¢ ciently as possible. Finally, the results suggested strongly
that "ine¢ ciency traps" may exist, meaning that it can be di¢ cult for economies with low levels of
e¢ ciency to catch up with the more e¢ cient ones. This observation is consistent with many theories
including the ones presented in the paper. Signicantly, our results indicate that a combination of aid
and good policies is a way out of the trap. This could explain the e¢ ciency improvement of low-income
countries discussed in Section 1.
There are, naturally, many caveats. The results may be sensitive to the measure of e¢ ciency used:
an alternative to estimate the e¢ ciency scores would be to use stochastic frontier analysis as in Hermes
et al. (2006). Secondly, our method of estimation may not take fully into account the criticism by
Simar and Wilson (2006) on the standard practice of estimating the determinants of e¢ ciency. They
suggest ways of remedying the problems, another possibility is to use methods of spatial econometrics.
Finally, the exercise here suggests that a potentially useful research agenda would be to combine
the decomposition of aid into its components (humanitarian aid separated from other types of aid,
project and program aid separated from direct budgetary assistance and so forth) and aid allocation
with studying the determinants of the various growth components to get a fuller understanding of aid
e¢ ciency and impacts of external debt.
21
A Appendix
A.1 Data Description
Table A.1. Data descriptions and sources
Variable Description Source
Efficiency (log) DEA-score Haaparanta and Virta (2007)
Some series were intrapolated and extrapolated
due to time period extension and 4-year periods.
Aid 1) Effective development assistance / real GDP Roodman (2004)
2) Net overseas development assistance / real GDP Roodman (2004)
Total debt service / exports 1) Nominal debt / exports World Bank (2006)
Initial external debt / GDP 1) Nominal debt / GDP World Bank (2006)
2) Net present value of debt / GDP Authors' calculations based on Dikhanov (2007)
Initial real GDP / capita (log) GDP / capita for the first year of period Roodman (2004)
Population growth Roodman (2004)
Schooling Mean years of secondary schooling among those over 25 Roodman (2004)
Gross fixed capital formation / GDP World Bank (2006)
Foreign direct investment / GDP World Bank (2006)
Growth rate of net barter terms of trade Authors' calculations based on World Bank (2006)
Budget surplus Roodman (2004)
Sachs-Warner Index of trade openness updated from Sachs and Warner (1995) Roodman (2004)
Frankel-Rose Trade instrument based on Frankel and Rose (2002) Andrew Rose's home page
Institutional quality Measures corruption, bureaucratic quality, and rule of law Roodman (2004)
Tropical area fraction Roodman (2004)
Note: Original data sources and more detailed variable descriptions for some of the variables are available in Roodman (2004).
Table A.2. Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Initial efficiency (log) 351 -0.636 0.423 -2.230 0
Effective development assistance / real GDP 351 1.476 2.113 -0.071 12.826
Net overseas development assistance / real GDP 351 2.146 2.824 -0.063 16.013
Initial nominal debt / GDP 327 0.736 0.823 0 10.644
Initial present value of debt / GDP 330 0.449 0.627 0 8.921
Total nominal debt service / exports 317 21.634 13.181 1.079 91.717
Initial real GDP / capita (log) 351 7.629 0.801 5.224 9.788
Population growth 351 2.177 0.961 -2.749 6.578
Schooling 351 1.002 0.717 0.035 4.004
Gross fixed capital formation / GDP 349 21.740 7.365 3.437 59.986
Foreign direct investment / GDP 346 1.960 3.002 -5.166 22.089
Growth rate of net barter terms of trade 337 -0.108 6.366 -23.647 28.907
Budget surplus 313 -0.035 0.056 -0.450 0.153
Sachs-Warner 333 0.448 0.481 0 1
Frankel-Rose 333 0.094 0.109 0.019 0.698
Institutional quality 327 4.610 1.739 0.556 10
Tropical area fraction 339 0.708 0.417 0 1
Note: Summary statistics for those aid recipient countries for which Haaparanta and Virta (2007)
calculate DEA-scores. Variables are 4-year averages if not otherwise stated.
A.2 Countries
(data not available for all countries in all regressions, maximum number of countries 57, minimum 45)
Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia,
Congo Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gam-
bia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Ko-
rea, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zim-
babwe
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